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Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Marriage 
Daniel O. Conkle* 
During oral argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry,1 Justice Scalia pressed 
advocate Theodore Olson with a provocative question: “I’m curious, . . . when did 
it become unconstitutional to exclude homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 
1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted? . . . [S]ome time after Baker 
[v. Nelson,2 decided in 1972], where we said it didn’t even raise a substantial 
Federal question? When—when—when did the law become this?”3 In the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hollingsworth and in United States v. Windsor,4 
of course, the premise of Scalia’s question does not yet hold. The Court evaded the 
Fourteenth Amendment issue in Hollingsworth,5 and it explicitly confined its 
decision in Windsor to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).6 Baker v. 
Nelson may still be controlling. In any event, the Supreme Court has not recognized 
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Not yet. But such a ruling seems 
increasingly inevitable. And if and when the Court rules in that manner, Scalia’s 
question will return to center stage.7 
There are various possible groundings for a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage. Creative minds might contend that the Fourteenth Amendment, properly 
understood, has always protected such a right. If so, then the answer to Scalia’s 
question is 1868, when the Amendment was ratified. It simply took us a while—a 
century and a half!—to understand the Amendment’s implications. Indeed, 
Professor Jack M. Balkin, among others, might be inclined to accept this sort of 
“originalist” argument.8 But it requires an account of original meaning that is so 
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 1. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 2. 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.). 
 3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(No. 12-144) (quoting Justice Scalia). 
 4. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 5. In a five-to-four ruling, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit lacked 
jurisdiction and that its judgment invalidating California’s ban on same-sex marriage should 
be vacated. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668. Neither the majority nor the dissenters 
reached the merits of the Fourteenth Amendment issue. 
 6. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 7. In fact, a variant of Scalia’s question, more broadly framed, has been debated for 
decades. See, e.g., Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean 
What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977). 
 8. See Francis Wilkinson, Originalism, Scalia and Gay Marriage: An Interview with 
Jack Balkin, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2013-03-26/originalism-scalia-and-gay-marriage-an-interview-with-jack-balkin.html; cf. 
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) 
(contending that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment can be understood to 
include the right to abortion). Balkin elaborates his theory in JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
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abstract—or, as Balkin would have it, so “thin”9—as to give originalism little or no 
constraining force, at least in the context of Fourteenth Amendment claims. In 
reality, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has changed over time, and it 
will continue to do so.10 In my judgment, moreover, this is precisely as it should 
be.11 
When the Supreme Court interprets the capacious language of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses,12 its task is art as much as science, judicial 
statesmanship as much as technical craft. The Court mediates past, present, and 
future, identifying individual rights that befit the evolving political morality of our 
society. By its very nature, the Fourteenth Amendment protects minority rights 
from state and local majoritarian oppression. But what rights, in particular, does the 
Amendment protect? In deciding this question, the Justices rely in part on 
precedent and in part on their own understandings of liberty and equality. At the 
same time, however, the Court generally acts, and properly so, in a manner that 
tracks the evolving values of the country as a whole. In so doing, the Court 
confronts contentious political-moral issues with a measure of judicial humility, 
and it deflects the charge that its actions are unduly countermajoritarian. 
When asked to recognize a new constitutional right, the Court should act neither 
too soon nor too late. The Court errs if it trumps the political process and 
federalism prematurely, as it seemingly did in Roe v. Wade.13 Yet at some point a 
claim of right, if persuasive to the Court as a matter of justice, should no longer be 
denied as a matter of prudence. At some point the country will be ready, or at least 
ready enough, for the Court to recognize a national constitutional right. As 
Professor Alexander M. Bickel observed, “the Court should declare as law only 
                                                                                                                 
ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 9. See Jack M. Balkin, Must We Be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM 
REV. LEGAL STUD. 57, 70–80 (2013). 
 10. Under Balkin’s sophisticated account, originalism itself can incorporate this 
change, with originalism and living constitutionalism being seen as “two sides of the same 
coin.” Id. at 80. 
 11.  In her thoughtful and thought-provoking contribution to this symposium, my 
colleague Dawn Johnsen likewise addresses the issue of constitutional change, offering 
observations that are in some respects complementary to my own. See Dawn Johnsen, 
Windsor, Shelby County, and the Demise of Originalism: A Personal Account, 
89 IND. L.J. 3 (2014). 
 12. “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice Ginsburg, for example, has contended that Roe 
“short-circuited the development of a political groundswell that was building at the state and 
local level—not only on the issue of abortion—but on all phases of women’s rights.” Allen 
Pusey, Ginsburg: Court Should Have Avoided Broad-Based Decision in Roe v. Wade, ABA 
JOURNAL (May 13, 2013, 9:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ginsburg 
_expands_on_her_disenchantment_with_roe_v._wade_legacy/; see also Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. 
REV. 375, 379–82, 385 (1985) (arguing that the Court should have confined itself to a 
narrow decision in Roe and describing the Court’s broad ruling as “[h]eavy-handed judicial 
intervention”). For a competing perspective, see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before 
(and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011). 
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such principles as will—in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future—gain 
general assent.”14 And whenever the Court acts, it should proceed with a measure 
of humility and caution, recognizing legitimate competing interests and minimizing 
its intrusion on our system of democratic self-government. 
Just as American societal values have changed over time, so too have the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court has 
already expanded the Amendment far beyond what its framers and ratifiers had in 
mind.15 Should the Court expand the Amendment even further, to embrace a right 
to same-sex marriage? Society’s perspective on this issue is in a state of flux. In a 
notable development in 2012, President Barack Obama, citing a new understanding 
of his Christian faith, announced that he no longer opposes same-sex marriage but 
instead supports it.16 And President Obama is not alone; the views of many 
Americans recently have “evolved” in the same direction.17 Indeed, as I will 
discuss, there has been a remarkably rapid, and seemingly inexorable, shift of 
opinion from opposition to approval. So, is it time for the Court to declare a 
national constitutional right? Or should the Court await further, more definitive 
evidence of a societal consensus that is likely to be enduring? And under what form 
of reasoning might a Fourteenth Amendment right be justified, either now or in the 
future? 
These questions have no easy answers. Even so, I hope to shed some light on 
them, especially the last one. Accordingly, I will briefly explore and evaluate three 
possible lines of Supreme Court reasoning, each of which might support a 
Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage: first, substantive due process; 
second, heightened scrutiny equal protection; and third, rational basis equal 
protection coupled with a finding of illicit “animus.” As we will see, each form of 
constitutional justification can find support in evolving national values. In my 
judgment, however, the first two alternatives, with primary emphasis on the second, 
present the best and strongest arguments for a right to same-sex marriage. By 
contrast, I think it would be misguided, or at least imprudent, for the Court to rely 
on the third line of reasoning. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 239 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). With the benefit of hindsight, it 
seems clear that Roe v. Wade did not satisfy this condition, because the Court’s 1973 
decision did not garner “general assent” in “a rather immediate foreseeable future.” Indeed, 
it has yet to do so even now, some forty years later. Whether and how the Court’s decision 
itself contributed to the ongoing controversy is a separate question. See supra note 13. 
 15. In the context of women’s rights, for instance, the Court has discarded Fourteenth 
Amendment doctrine dating back to the 1870s—and presumably reflecting the framers’ and 
ratifiers’ sentiments—as “no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the 
individual, or the Constitution.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897 
(1992). 
 16. Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, Taking Stand 
on Charged Social Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A1. 
 17. Prior to his announcement, President Obama had stated that his views on the issue 
were “evolving.” Id. 
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I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
The substantive due process argument for same-sex marriage builds upon a line 
of cases beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.18 In these cases, relying mainly on the Due Process Clause, the Court 
has recognized a number of unenumerated constitutional rights, including the right 
to conventional marriage19 and the right of adults, including homosexuals, to 
engage in consensual sexual conduct.20 At times the Court has asserted that 
substantive due process rights are confined to rights that “are, objectively, ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’”21—that is, rights that have broad and 
longstanding historical support, as revealed in specific legal policies and social 
practices.22 This backward-looking theory of historical tradition might well support 
the protection of conventional marriage,23 but it plainly would not support a right to 
same-sex marriage.24 Hardly a deeply rooted American tradition, same-sex 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In fact, this line of cases, more broadly understood, can be 
seen to include earlier decisions as well. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
 19. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (declaring that “the right to marry is 
part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause”). 
 20. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 21. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)); cf. id. (quoting the more 
abstract “ordered liberty” formulation of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 
(1937), but using this language in a restrictive manner, noting that substantive due process 
rights must be deeply rooted historically “and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ 
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed’” (emphasis added)). 
 22. See id. at 710–28. 
 23.  But cf. Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1401–07 (2010) (suggesting that substantive due process might not 
protect a right to civil marriage, not even conventional marriage, in the sense that the 
government, in theory, could abolish civil marriage altogether). 
 24. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2714–15 (2013) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). One might resist this conclusion by contending that the tradition of marriage 
should be conceptualized more broadly, at a level of generality sufficient to encompass 
marriage between consenting adults, without regard to the conventional opposite-sex 
limitation. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991–93 (2010), aff’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub 
nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); see also Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 
23, at 1391–95 (advancing this argument, but conceding that it has had very limited success 
in the courts); see generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in 
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1088 (1990) (noting that “historical 
traditions, like rights themselves, exist at various levels of generality”). As I have explained 
elsewhere, however, this move toward abstraction—defining traditions at levels of generality 
that historical actors plainly would have rejected—deprives the theory of historical tradition 
of its ability to provide an objective standard of judicial decision making. See Daniel O. 
Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 92–94 (2006). At 
the same time, it undermines the theory’s normative justification, a justification that depends 
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marriage was not recognized by any state until 2003 (nor by any country until 
2000).25 
Conversely, at other times the Court has suggested a more progressive, forward-
looking theory of substantive due process, a theory of evolving national values. 
Under this decision-making model, the Court can recognize an unenumerated right 
despite the absence of historical support, as long as the right has broad support in 
the contemporary United States. Under this approach, constitutional rights can 
emerge over time, reflecting ongoing legal developments, especially at the state-
law level, which may suggest a salutary maturation of societal thinking.26 This type 
of progressive methodology played a prominent role in the Court’s 2003 decision 
in Lawrence v. Texas,27 which protected the right of homosexual adults to engage 
in consensual sexual conduct. It likewise might support a right to same-sex 
marriage, although—in the absence of additional state-law changes in this setting—
the argument would go considerably beyond the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence.28 
In Lawrence, the Court advanced various justifications for its decision, 
including the Justices’ own determination that criminal prohibitions on homosexual 
conduct violate “liberty of the person,” which “presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”29 
The Justices did not dismiss the opposing view as bigotry or intolerance, observing 
that it may reflect “profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral 
principles.”30 Even so, they concluded that the claim of liberty was paramount and 
must prevail.31 Notably, however, the Justices emphasized that their own 
understanding of liberty was supported by a contemporary national consensus. 
Thus, the Court put aside the long history of sodomy prohibitions, both in America 
                                                                                                                 
in part on considerations of democratic self-government, in part on Burkean philosophy, and 
in part on society’s interests in legal stability and in protecting settled expectations 
concerning individual freedom. See id. at 90–92, 94–96; Michael W. McConnell, The Right 
to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 682–85, 683 n.96. The 
move toward abstraction here, to my mind, is similar to the move toward abstraction in 
expansive understandings of originalism, and I find neither of these efforts particularly 
helpful in determining the scope of contemporary constitutional rights. 
 25. Massachusetts was the first state and Netherlands the first country. See Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 26.  In still other cases, especially in the context of abortion, the Court has gone even 
further, embracing a theory of reasoned judgment. Under this theory, the Court, through a 
process of political-moral reasoning, is free to recognize rights even if the rights lack 
widespread historical or contemporary support. The Court’s various decisions thus reflect 
three competing theories of substantive due process: historical tradition, evolving national 
values, and reasoned judgment. In an earlier article, using criteria that draw upon 
considerations of majoritarian self-government, judicial objectivity, and functional utility, I 
have explored and evaluated these three theories, arguing that although each has strengths 
and weaknesses, the best approach, on balance, is that of evolving national values. See 
Conkle, supra note 24. 
 27. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 28. The following analysis of Lawrence draws upon Conkle, supra note 24, at 121–23. 
 29. 539 U.S. at 562. 
 30. Id. at 571. 
 31. See id. at 574. To this extent, the Court’s decision relied on a methodology of 
reasoned judgment. For elaboration, see Conkle, supra note 24, at 119–21. 
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and in western civilization generally, concluding instead that “our laws and 
traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here.”32 These legal and 
societal changes, the Court argued, revealed “an emerging awareness that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”33 
More specifically, the Court cited the Model Penal Code of 1955, which 
recommended the repeal of laws forbidding consensual sodomy, and the eventual 
legislative adoption of this approach by a substantial majority of the states.34 These 
legislative developments, coupled with five state court invalidations under state 
constitutional law,35 left only thirteen states with sodomy prohibitions at the time of 
Lawrence.36 Even in these thirteen states, moreover, consensual sodomy was rarely 
prosecuted, suggesting that legal and social disapproval was waning.37 The Court’s 
decision in Lawrence, therefore, was supported by powerful evidence of a national 
consensus, a legal and societal consensus that had developed and endured over the 
course of several decades. 
Is there a similar trend favoring the recognition of same-sex marriage? Yes, but 
this trend, to date, is far less compelling. Indeed, except in the last few years, state 
law making has been moving decidedly in the opposite direction, with some thirty 
states recently amending their state constitutions to expressly prohibit same-sex 
marriage.38 In the last five years, however, it seems that the tide has turned. Not 
counting California, which is implementing same-sex marriage under a federal 
court mandate,39 fifteen states and the District of Columbia have acted to recognize 
same-sex marriage.40 Several of these jurisdictions have acted as the result of state 
court rulings under state constitutional law; the remainder have acted legislatively 
or by popular referendum.41 Notably, the largest part of this trend is extremely 
recent: Except for Massachusetts, all of the same-sex marriage jurisdictions have 
acted since 2008, with most of them acting only in 2012 or 2013.42 And even now, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72. 
 33. Id. at 572. 
 34. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 (1980)). 
 35. See id. at 576. 
 36. Id. at 573. Looking beyond our nation’s borders, the Court also cited comparable 
legislative and judicial action in Europe. Id. at 572–73, 576. 
 37. See id. at 573. 
 38. One state, North Carolina, adopted this sort of constitutional amendment as 
recently as 2012. See Campbell Robertson, Ban on Gay Marriage Passes in North Carolina, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A15. All of the other states acted between 1998 and 2008. For a 
chronological listing of these state constitutional amendments, see History of State 
Constitutional Marriage Bans, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry
/state-constitutional-marriage-bans#_ftn1. 
 39. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010), aff’d on other grounds 
sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 40. Defining Marriage: State Defense of Marriage Laws and Same-Sex Marriage, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-
services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id.; Same Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (last 
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only a third of the states have moved in this direction, creating roughly the mirror 
image of Lawrence, in which only a fourth of the states had declined to act in a 
favorable manner. 
To be sure, there is other evidence of changing societal values. Surveys suggest 
that a majority of Americans now support same-sex marriage,43 thus signaling a 
remarkable turnaround in public opinion.44 Young people are especially supportive, 
and, more generally, the trend lines are strongly positive.45 In the language of 
Lawrence, there may be “an emerging awareness”46 favoring a right to same-sex 
marriage. For the Court to rely on such reasoning here, however, would be a matter 
of prediction, not the accomplished fact that was evident in Lawrence. The survey 
evidence certainly suggests a persistent trend, but the trend is of very recent 
vintage, and society has had little experience with same-sex marriage, a practice 
that departs from centuries of tradition and that, over time, could have 
unanticipated consequences.47 Although it seems unlikely, the shift of societal 
opinion could slow in the face of experience, or opinion might even change 
directions once again. 
Under the theory of evolving national values, there is a plausible argument that 
substantive due process supports a right to same-sex marriage. Yet this argument, 
standing alone, seems inadequate to the task. The Justices’ own understanding of 
liberty, grounded in arguments of political morality, might very well support such a 
claim. Given the competing demands of federalism and the political process, 
however, the Justices should be reluctant to act merely on their own political-moral 
judgment. The shift in societal opinion is supportive, as is the recent pattern of state 
law recognition, but it seems premature to conclude that there is a national 
consensus on this issue, much less a consensus that is likely to be enduring. At least 
for now, substantive due process seems insufficient to support a Fourteenth 
Amendment right to same-sex marriage, even under a progressive theory of 
evolving national values. That is, substantive due process, without more, seems 
insufficient. But there is more. 
                                                                                                                 
updated Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex
-marriage-laws.aspx. For an interactive map of the United States, showing changes in state 
law from 1995 to the present, see Same-Sex Marriage State-by-State, PEW RESEARCH 
RELIGION & PUB. LIFE PROJECT (last updated Nov. 20, 2013), http://features.pewforum.org
/same-sex-marriage-state-by-state/. 
 43. E.g., Susan Page, Poll: Support for Gay Marriage Hits High After Ruling, USA 
TODAY (July 1, 2013, 10:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/07/01
/poll-supreme-court-gay-marriage-affirmative-action-voting-rights/2479541/. 
 44. See Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Is Changing, and What It 
Means, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com
/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/. 
 45. See id. Using sophisticated modeling, Nate Silver predicts that same-sex marriage 
soon will command majority support throughout most of the United States. In particular, he 
suggests that if the issue were placed on the ballot, it would be supported by voters in thirty-
two states by 2016 and by voters in forty-four states by 2020. Id. 
 46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). 
 47. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2715 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“The long-term consequences of this change are not now known and are unlikely to be 
ascertainable for some time to come.”). 
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II. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY EQUAL PROTECTION 
As an alternative or additional argument for extending marriage to same-sex 
couples, the Supreme Court, not surprisingly, might turn to the Equal Protection 
Clause. Beyond its obvious textual appeal, equal protection is an attractive 
argument because the Court’s existing doctrine includes precedents that can readily 
be extended to the same-sex marriage context. Thus, building upon its existing 
doctrine, the Court could conclude, as did the Second Circuit in Windsor, that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is “quasi-suspect,” triggering heightened 
scrutiny,48 and that laws precluding gays and lesbians from marrying cannot 
survive this demanding review. 
The central historical focus of the Equal Protection Clause was racial 
discrimination.49 As Professor Archibald Cox observed, however, “Once loosed, 
the idea of Equality is not easily cabined.”50 Thus, the Supreme Court has treated 
racial discrimination as the paradigmatic “suspect classification,” triggering strict 
judicial scrutiny and probable invalidation,51 but it has reasoned by analogy in 
declaring that certain other classifications also are presumptively unconstitutional. 
These extensions of the Equal Protection Clause reflect a reasoned extrapolation 
from the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but they do not depend 
on the original meaning in any specific sense. Instead, they rest mainly on the 
Justices’, and society’s, changing understandings of what equality demands. 
In deciding whether to treat a nonracial classification as “suspect” or “quasi-
suspect,” the Court has invoked various criteria, but, as I will explain, three have 
been especially influential. First, is the classifying trait, like race, an immutable 
personal characteristic—an accident of birth beyond a person’s control or 
responsibility—rendering it presumptively unjust for the government to use the 
trait as a basis for allocating rewards or penalties? Second, is the trait, like race, 
broadly irrelevant to legitimate generalization, rendering discrimination on this 
basis not only unfair but also indefensible in a wide range of governmental 
settings? And third, is the disadvantaged group, like African Americans and other 
racial minorities, a group that lacks political power and that therefore warrants 
special judicial solicitude, that is, special protection from the ordinary operation of 
the political process? 
In addressing gender discrimination, for instance, the Supreme Court, acting 
more than a century after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, moved from its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d on other 
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 49. Indeed, as the Supreme Court declared shortly after their ratification, all three of 
the post-Civil War Amendments were animated by “one pervading purpose”: “the freedom 
of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of 
the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly 
exercised unlimited dominion over him.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873). 
 50. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term—Foreword: Constitutional 
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91 (1966). 
 51. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (declaring that any racial 
classification is “immediately suspect” and demands “strict scrutiny,” which renders the 
classification invalid unless it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”). 
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traditional deferential stance52 to a vigorous form of heightened scrutiny (albeit 
falling short of the full strict scrutiny that applies to race). In so doing, the Court 
made gender discrimination “quasi-suspect,” for reasons best articulated in Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson.53 As Brennan explained, 
gender is substantially similar to race under each of the three criteria that I have 
outlined: first, it is an “immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident 
of birth”;54 second, it “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or 
contribute to society”;55 and third, women not only suffered historically from 
political disadvantages56 but also (at least in 1973, when Frontiero was decided) 
continued to “face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination,” 
including “in the political arena.”57 Accordingly, as the Court later held, gender-
based classifications require an “exceedingly persuasive justification”58 and violate 
equal protection unless they “serve important governmental objectives and [are] 
substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives.”59 Using similar 
reasoning, the Court has also extended strict or heightened scrutiny to 
classifications based on alienage and illegitimacy.60 
The Supreme Court’s three-part analysis calls for judgments of fact and value, 
judgments that directly address political-moral questions of justice and fairness as 
well as the judiciary’s role in redressing failures in the political process. At the 
same time, however, the Court’s extensions of the Equal Protection Clause—for 
example, to protect women and illegitimate children from historically sanctioned 
forms of discrimination—generally have tracked the changing values of society 
itself. In Frontiero, for example, even as he cited the continuing political 
disadvantages faced by women, Justice Brennan found support for heightened 
scrutiny in the very fact that Congress itself, reflecting the shifting values of the 
day, recently had “manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based 
classifications.”61 More broadly, speaking in a later case, Justice Marshall candidly 
observed that “constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of 
liberty, property, and due process, evolve over time.”62 Moreover, he continued, 
when “[s]hifting cultural, political, and social patterns” lead to changing patterns of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). 
 53. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 54. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 684–85. 
 57. Id. at 686. 
 58. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).  
 59. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 60. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (illegitimacy); Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (alienage). 
 61. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687 (plurality opinion). Brennan cited congressional 
antidiscrimination legislation as well as the proposed (albeit unratified) Equal Rights 
Amendment. Id. at 687–88. 
 62. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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legislation, “courts should look to the fact of such change as a source of guidance 
on evolving principles of equality.”63 
Under the three-factor inquiry, the argument for extending heightened scrutiny 
to sexual orientation is straightforward. First, it is increasingly clear that for the 
vast majority of individuals, sexual orientation is immutable, not a matter of 
choice.64 Thus, under the first criterion, sexual orientation is a good fit, albeit not 
perfect. Second, as with gender, sexual orientation, in most legal settings, is an 
invalid basis for generalization and therefore for governmental policy making. 
Even if sexual orientation is relevant to certain issues, perhaps including marriage, 
these issues are few and far between. As a result, the second criterion is readily 
satisfied. And third, as the Second Circuit concluded in Windsor, the political 
position of gays and lesbians today is analogous to that of women at the time of 
Frontiero: Having endured a long history of prejudice and disadvantage, they have 
made considerable progress, “but they still ‘face pervasive, although at times more 
subtle, discrimination . . . in the political arena.’”65 As a result, it remains difficult 
for homosexuals “to politically protect themselves from wrongful 
discrimination,”66 suggesting that the judiciary should play an active role under the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
Simultaneously, also as in Frontiero, there is evidence of a shift in societal 
values that may support an evolving principle of equality that demands heightened 
scrutiny in this context. As with gender discrimination at the time of Frontiero, 
Congress recently has shown at least some “increasing sensitivity”67 to sexual 
orientation discrimination, acting in 2009 to extend special federal protection to 
victims of violence based on sexual orientation68 and in 2010 to repeal the 
discriminatory military policy known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”69 Many states 
have gone further, adopting antidiscrimination laws and policies in a variety of 
settings, including employment and housing.70 More generally, Americans are 
increasingly tolerant of homosexuality, in part because they are coming to agree 
that it is indeed an accident of birth.71 Thus, just as Theodore Olson argued in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Gregory M. Herek, Aaron T. Norton, Thomas J. Allen & Charles L. 
Sims, Demographic, Psychological, and Social Characteristics of Self-Identified Lesbian, 
Gay, and Bisexual Adults in a U.S. Probability Sample, 7 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 176 
(2010), cited in Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 986 (N.D. Cal. 
2012), appeal dismissed, Nos. 12-15388, 12-15409, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15192 (9th Cir. 
July 23, 2013). 
 65. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion)), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687 (plurality opinion). 
 68. See Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-84, §§ 4701–13, 123 Stat. 2835, 2835–44 (2009). 
 69. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 
3515 (2010). 
 70. See Maps of State Laws & Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org
/resources/entry/maps-of-state-laws-policies. 
 71. See Jeffrey M. Jones, More Americans See Gay, Lesbian Orientation as Birth 
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response to Justice Scalia’s vexing question of “when,” it may be that the meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause changed “when we—as a culture determined that 
sexual orientation is a characteristic of individuals that they cannot control.”72 Even 
if Americans remain divided on the particular question of same-sex marriage, their 
more general shift of opinion—reflected to a significant degree in legal changes at 
the federal and state levels—tends to support a new understanding of equal 
protection, an understanding that in turn may bear on the issue of marriage. 
Over time, changing societal attitudes about gays and lesbians may undermine 
the argument that they are politically disadvantaged and therefore warrant special 
judicial solicitude. For now, however, it appears that homosexuals continue to face 
sufficient prejudice and disadvantage to satisfy the third part of the three-factor 
analysis. At the same time, this lingering political handicap makes their political 
successes, with respect to same-sex marriage and more generally, all the more 
remarkable and all the more indicative of evolving societal values. As with gender 
at the time of Frontiero, then, there is a strong argument that discrimination based 
on sexual orientation, including prohibitions on same-sex marriage, should be 
subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, an active 
judicial role may be especially appropriate in vindicating a right to same-sex 
marriage because most of the prohibitions are embodied in state constitutional 
amendments, thus removing them from the ordinary process of political change.73 
If the gender formulation of heightened scrutiny is applied, same-sex marriage 
prohibitions cannot survive in the absence of an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification,”74 which requires the government to demonstrate that they “serve 
important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related to [the] 
achievement of those objectives.”75 By every indication, no such justification 
exists. As discussed below, it may very well be rational and reasonable to restrict 
marriage to opposite-sex couples, but that is not enough to satisfy heightened 
scrutiny. To be sure, there are governmental objectives that could qualify as 
“important”—notably, encouraging responsible procreation and sound 
childrearing—but these objectives are likely to falter under the “substantial 
relationship” requirement, because there is little evidence that same-sex marriage 
prohibitions substantially advance these objectives.76 Justifications along these 
                                                                                                                 
Factor, GALLUP POLITICS (May 16, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162569/americans
-gay-lesbian-orientation-birth-factor.aspx. 
 72. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(No. 12-144) (quoting Theodore B. Olson). “There’s no specific date in time,” Olson 
continued. “This is an evolutionary cycle.” Id. 
 73. In previous cases, the Supreme Court has invalidated the imposition of special 
political hurdles on the advancement of equality claims. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 
393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 74. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
 75. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 76. The district court in Hollingsworth boldly concluded—in my view, mistakenly—
that arguments along these lines failed even rational basis review. In any event, the court’s 
evaluation of the evidence clearly suggests that these justifications are inadequate under 
heightened scrutiny. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 999–1000 (2010), 
aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
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lines, however reasonable, simply are not “exceedingly persuasive.” As a result, 
heightened scrutiny equal protection strongly supports the invalidation of these 
prohibitions and therefore a Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage.77 
III. RATIONAL BASIS EQUAL PROTECTION AND ILLICIT “ANIMUS” 
As we have seen, there is a plausible argument that substantive due process 
supports a right to same-sex marriage, and there is a far stronger argument that 
equal protection supports such a right, on the ground that classifications based on 
sexual orientation are quasi-suspect, calling for heightened scrutiny that marriage 
prohibitions cannot survive. Each argument is informed by evolving societal 
values, and the two arguments can work in tandem. Taken together, but with equal 
protection doing most of the work, these arguments can readily justify a Fourteenth 
Amendment right to same-sex marriage. 
There is a third potential basis for a right to same-sex marriage, also grounded in 
equal protection but not requiring a declaration that classifications based on sexual 
orientation are quasi-suspect.78 Instead, the Supreme Court, extending its reasoning 
in Windsor, could conclude that state law prohibitions on same-sex marriage are 
invalid even under rational basis scrutiny because they reflect an unconstitutional 
“animus” toward gays and lesbians, that is, “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group.”79 A similar analysis has been used in other cases,80 including 
Romer v. Evans,81 which also addressed discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.82 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. If the Supreme Court were to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in this fashion, 
it would be echoing the state law rulings of three state supreme courts, including the 
California Supreme Court in the decision that led to Proposition 8 and later Hollingsworth. 
Each of these courts, applying state constitutional law, concluded that classifications based 
on sexual orientation warrant heightened scrutiny—indeed, in the case of California, full-
fledged strict scrutiny—and that same-sex marriage prohibitions cannot survive that review. 
See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 78. In fact, although I cannot address it in the limited space of this Essay, there is yet 
another equal protection argument that might be advanced, an argument grounded in the 
fundamental interests strand of equal protection doctrine. See Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 
23, at 1412–49. 
 79. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 80. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47, 450 
(1985); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35. As Professor Cass R. Sunstein has suggested, this 
strand of equal protection doctrine provides “a kind of magical trump card” that can be “used 
to invalidate badly motivated laws without refining a new kind of scrutiny.” Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1996). 
 81. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see id. at 632, 634–36. 
 82. In Romer, the Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that had 
nullified and precluded state and local laws and policies protecting gays and lesbians from 
sexual orientation discrimination. See id. at 623–24. 
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In the context of marriage, this line of reasoning might be supported in part by 
evolving national values, on the view that society is coming to regard opposition to 
same-sex marriage as not merely wrong but illegitimate—the product of antiquated 
and untenable prejudice and bigotry. This perspective is not implausible. As 
discussed earlier, there is a long history of bias against homosexuals, and this bias 
surely has played a role in the continuing opposition to same-sex marriage. But 
there are less pernicious grounds for supporting the conventional approach to 
marriage, and, even as societal thinking about homosexuality has evolved, it is 
hardly apparent that prejudice or bias is the exclusive or dominant motivation in 
this particular setting. As a result, the notion that evolving values support the view 
that marriage restrictions are animus-based is, at best, highly contentious. More 
generally, in my view, the Court was wrong to rely on animus reasoning in 
Windsor, and, in any event, it should not extend this reasoning to state laws that 
affirm the traditional approach to marriage. 
In Windsor, the Court nullified section 3 of DOMA, a 1996 statute declaring 
that, regardless of state law, “marriage” under federal law was confined to 
opposite-sex couples.83 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court invoked 
various considerations, including federalism84 and hints of substantive due 
process.85 The Court’s primary argument, however, was that Congress had acted 
with illicit “animus,” thus violating equal protection.86 Because it declined to adopt 
heightened scrutiny, the Court necessarily concluded—albeit without serious 
discussion—that section 3 could not survive rational basis review, that is, that it did 
not rationally serve any legitimate governmental interest.87 Otherwise, the Court 
could not have concluded, as it did, that DOMA was animated by “a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”88 
In fact, however, as noted by the Windsor dissenters, section 3 did serve 
interests that appear to be perfectly legitimate, and it did so in an entirely rational 
manner. Most obviously, it preserved, within the federal domain, an approach to 
marriage that had prevailed throughout history and that continues to reflect a 
reasoned—albeit now contested—understanding of this important institution.89 It 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
 84. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–93 (emphasizing that the states, not the federal 
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 85. See id. at 2695 (declaring that DOMA denies “the liberty protected by the Due 
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 88. Id. at 2693 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
 89. See id. at 2718–19 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: 
WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 258–59 (2009) (explaining that there are competing 
conceptions of “the purpose, or telos, of marriage as a social institution,” with the traditional 
view focusing on procreation and the argument for same-sex marriage emphasizing loving 
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likewise advanced interests in legal stability and uniformity,90 and it avoided 
difficult choice-of-law questions, questions that now will arise precisely because 
this provision has been nullified.91 In reality, the Court could not invalidate section 
3 under ordinary rational basis principles. Rather, it seems clear that the Court 
applied a version of heightened scrutiny. But it did so sub silencio, and therefore 
without a stated justification. 
As I have explained, there is a strong argument that laws discriminating against 
gays and lesbians, including section 3 of DOMA, should indeed be subject to 
heightened scrutiny. But there is little to be said for judicial obfuscation. Justice 
Marshall’s observation concerning an earlier “animus” ruling is equally fitting 
here: “[I]t is important to articulate, as the Court does not, the facts and principles 
that justify subjecting [a law] to the searching review—the heightened scrutiny—
that actually leads to its invalidation.”92 What is more, as Chief Justice Roberts 
observed in Windsor, a finding of legislative “animus” is insulting and 
disrespectful, “tar[ring] the political branches with the brush of bigotry.”93 Thus, in 
Windsor, the Court accused Congress of acting (by overwhelming congressional 
majorities, no less)94 merely—or at least primarily—purposefully to “injure,”95 
“disapprov[e],”96 “stigma[tize],”97 “demean,”98 and “degrade”99 same-sex married 
couples and to “humiliate[]” their children.100 This is an especially disturbing 
charge when, as here, the judicial insult is gratuitous, because the Court could 
readily have reached the same result in another, far more persuasive manner: by 
candidly adopting heightened scrutiny and invalidating section 3 on that basis. 
When the question turns from DOMA to state laws, moreover, there are 
additional reasons for avoiding animus-based reasoning. In the first place, the state-
law context eliminates the federalism concern that was present in Windsor and that 
the Court directly linked to its animus rationale. Declaring that “[d]iscriminations 
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 90. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., 
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 93. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 94. See id. 
 95.  Id. at 2693 (majority opinion). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 2695. 
 99.  Id. 
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of an unusual character” are more likely to reflect “an improper animus or 
purpose,”101 the Court concluded that “DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual 
tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage . . . is strong 
evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval.”102 According to 
the Court, then, there were two competing traditions in Windsor: the tradition of 
opposite-sex marriage, recognized “throughout the history of civilization,”103 but 
also the tradition of treating marriage questions “as being within the authority and 
realm of the separate States.”104 State law prohibitions on same-sex marriage, by 
contrast, simultaneously honor both traditions, making them immune from the 
charge that they deviate from tradition and are therefore suggestive of illicit 
animus.105 Nor, with rare exception, do these prohibitions take away preexisting 
state law rights, a factor cited by the Ninth Circuit in Hollingsworth to support its 
finding of improper animus in the adoption of California’s Proposition 8.106 More 
generally, like President Obama before his recent change of heart, those who 
oppose same-sex marriage may be wrong, but it would be equally wrong to “tar 
[them] with the brush of bigotry.”107 
In addition, the recognition of same-sex marriage as a Fourteenth Amendment 
right will raise a host of religious liberty questions. In Hollingsworth and Windsor, 
the Supreme Court turned a deaf ear to these questions, ignoring an amicus brief 
from prominent religious liberty scholars (Douglas Laycock, Marc D. Stern, and 
Thomas C. Berg) on behalf of the American Jewish Committee.108 The brief urged 
the Court, as it moves toward the recognition of same-sex marriage, to ensure not 
only the liberty of same-sex couples—which the brief fully supports—but also the 
liberty of religious objectors.109 Needless to say, if the Court were to recognize a 
right to same-sex marriage by characterizing opponents as animus-driven, that 
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reasoning would hardly support a sensitive accommodation of these important 
competing liberties.110 
CONCLUSION 
Returning to Justice Scalia’s question about the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
meaning over time, I would propose the following response: A constitutional right 
to same-sex marriage will emerge, and properly so, when the Supreme Court 
determines that justice so requires and when that determination is sufficiently 
supported by evolving national values that the Court’s recognition of this right 
“will—in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future—gain general 
assent.”111 In my judgment, we are fast approaching that juncture.112 The Court 
could rely on “animus” reasoning to reach this result, and, if Scalia is correct, it is 
likely to do so.113 But that line of analysis was seriously flawed in Windsor, and it 
would be especially misguided, or at least imprudent, for the Justices to extend it to 
the state-law context. As an alternative rationale, substantive due process would 
provide plausible support for a right to same-sex marriage, but only to a limited 
degree. By every indication, the strongest, most candid, and most judicious 
rationale would rest on equal protection, with the Court concluding that 
classifications based on sexual orientation are quasi-suspect, triggering heightened 
scrutiny that marriage prohibitions cannot survive. 
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